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The Households of Portuguese infantes in the Avis Dynasty: Formation and 








The objective of this essay is to discuss the political role of the seigniorial households of 
the Portuguese infantes (princes) during the sixteenth century, taking into account the 
degree of autonomy progressively acquired by these individuals and by their respective 
entourages. In particular, I will explore how these institutions are related to the Crown 
and other nobility. This dimension is characterized by periods when the existence of 
inter-institutional cooperation is verified, intermixed with episodes of conflict between 
them. It is assumed, therefore, that there are situations in which the households of the 
infantes declare their will to collaborate with the diverse political projects of the 
monarchy. On other occasions, it is clear that these households carried out projects of 
their own, which often resulted in the Crown attempting to control them. 
 I will argue in this paper that the households of the infantes were relevant in the 
territorial and political control of the kingdom during the first half of sixteenth century, 
namely in the balance of power between nobility and the Crown. Factors such as the 
existence of a web of interpersonal relationships between the titled nobility or a policy 
of resource redistribution between the central government and the latter helped the 
monarchy to control the destination and reproduction of its members, and thus avoided 
an even greater degree of political division. The use of a wide range of resources 
granted by the Crown gradually gave the households of the infantes significant potential 
to attract clientele and, thus, a considerable degree of competitiveness with the other 
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noble households. Then, I will address several issues associated with the formation and 
composition of the households of the infantes while integrating them into the 
historiography of the evolution of the royal households and courts. I will then turn to the 
emergence of the entourages of the Manueline infantes within the royal household to 
clarify the origin of the households of the respective individuals that coincides with a 
period of progressive emancipation from the Crown. Finally, I will evaluate certain 
variables displayed by these households – resources, patronage, composition of 
respective entourages – and assess their importance to the balance of the political forces 
regarding the Portuguese monarchy in this period. 
 
Historiography and the Problem 
 
The formation and development of the households of the infantes pose an issue that I 
will tackle in two ways: first, as part of the development of the court as a political 
institution during the medieval and modern period, and second, in the context of the 
emergence of the proto-state forms of government in precontemporary Europe.
2
 The 
subject has been discussed regularly by historians since Elias’s classic thesis. His 
model, based on royal centralization amid the gradual loss of autonomy of the 
aristocratic power, has generated strong criticism in recent decades.
3
 Many of these 
commentaries discuss the relationship between the monarchy and nobility. One matter 
of importance is the existence of a reciprocity between both parties. This reciprocity 
was of fundamental importance for the rule of the respective pre-modern political units, 
which challenges the premise of the royal court being a center of domestication of the 
nobility. This perspective was centered on the existence of a model with a plurality of 
courts, where princely and noble households replicated the royal domestic model of 




 On the other hand, the existence of intense debate about the role of the royal 
court and household in the government of the European kingdoms during the early 
modern period must be pointed out. The crux of the problem is in the evolution of the 
institutions in the political sphere of the monarchy, and in the way these allow a greater 
or lesser degree of political centralization. In the Portuguese context and time period 
considered here, the opinions are mainly divided into two main theoretical plans that are 
not totally divergent. The first perspective argues that the reforms carried out in the late 
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fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, combined with the vicissitudes resulting from 
overseas expansion, led to an appreciable degree of political centralization. Implications 
of this symbolic affirmation that strengthened the monarchy were visible in the political 
patronage of the different social strata, especially towards the nobility.
5
 Some authors 
argued that, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the members of the Avis 
dynasty generally decided to integrate the elites from the kingdom into the royal 
household, not just to coordinate the government between the center and periphery, but 
also to strengthen and legitimize its own power.
6
 The second perspective, strongly 
influenced by the legal history, emphasizes the existence of a polysinodal monarchy, 
where power spreading throughout the Portuguese territory was a reality until the liberal 
period. Based on this premise, the persistence of the seigniorial jurisdictions configured 
a privileged area of activity for the nobility and ecclesiastic lords where the king was 
unable to interfere. Thus, the degree of political centralization until the end of the 
Ancien Régime tended to be low.
7
 
 Although they disagree in many features, these views reveal some points of 
convergence. For example, both recognize that, due to the insufficiency of resources of 
the central power, commitment between the king and nobility is essential for governing 
the most peripheral areas of the territory. This point is perhaps the most interesting for 
discussing the importance of the households of the infantes as alternative centers of 
power to the royal court. The Avis dynasty was known for donating large portions of 
land to members of royalty normally associated with a title that established their 
primacy in the stratification of the kingdom’s nobility.
8
 In fact, throughout this period, 
many of these jurisdictional areas were controlled by infantes and their descendants. In 
addition, the household became a means that allowed control to be exerted over these 
areas through a series of seigniorial practices at the local and regional level. Also, it 
should be noted that the concept of a “household” based on the coeval context studied 
here not only refers to the domestic space, but also to the rest of the seigniorial spaces, 
both public and private.
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The power bestowed to these infantes was considerable. As such, the Crown tried 
whenever possible to delegate political projects to them, whether within the metropolis 
or in the scope of overseas territories. The model of governance in force during the 
modern period would facilitate the infantes’ cooperation with the monarchy, given the 
patriarchal prominence that the pater familias had in the domestic economy. In effect, 





 However, this type of cooperation did not always occur. From the point of 
view of the Crown, the concession of a household to an infante (as well as the material 
and jurisdictional bases to sustain it) involved a variable degree of risk. As a result, the 
political rebellions that occurred during the fifteenth century, which occasionally 




 In light of this, the refinement of royal mechanisms certainly helped control the 
ambitions of these households and the individuals who possessed them. These 
mechanisms included policy concerning the granting of titles; the foros, a system of 
social hierarchy applied to the moradores of the royal household; and the Mental Law, a 
legal mechanism, based on the principles of indivisibility, inalienability, primogeniture 
and masculinity, which regulated the transmission of the crown’s patrimonial assets.
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On the other hand, the actual reproduction of the households and estates of the infantes 
was conditioned by the marriage policy of the Crown. Some members of the royal 
house, such as infantes Luís (1506-55) and Maria (1521-77), could not marry mostly 
due to royal imposition; other, such as infantes Afonso (1509-40) and Henrique (1512-
80), were pushed to ecclesiastic careers early on. 
 Nevertheless, it is important to reflect on the political loyalty of the elites 
belonging to these princely courts. As noted for the progeny of Joao I (r.1385-1433), the 
growing complexity of the households of the infantes Duarte, Pedro, and Henrique was 
manifested in the political participation of the members with whom they were 
associated. At that time, it was well understood that the infantes actively participated in 
the king’s decision-making process, with help from his closest advisors.
13
 Regarding 
this trend, the government of Joao III (r. 1521-1557) presents some similarities. The 
political participation of Luis, Afonso, and Henrique is recognized at different times and 
in different contexts during the rule of their brother Joao III. Less clear is the role of the 
closest advisors to these princes, largely due to the absence of in-depth prosopographic 
studies that could establish clear and elucidated profiles about this group. Therefore, it 
is important to understand the attraction that the households of the infantes have over 
both small and lesser nobility compared to the same practices carried out by the Crown 







The Entourages of the Infantes: Formation and Development 
 
The first large wave of donations to the Portuguese infantes to form the respective 
households, done in a premeditated manner, was carried out during the kingdom of Joao 
I (r. 1385-1433). The process seems to have been similar to a certain degree throughout 
the West during the medieval period, where the division of the territorial ownership by 
the princes belonging to the same ruling household favored a certain degree of 
competition and distribution of power.
14
 Some authors pointed out that this model for 
these structures was inspired by the English context, where members related to the royal 
household owned extensive land and were representatives of the royal power itself.
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This seems to be true, especially in light of the policy regarding the donation of titles 
which existed between both kingdoms, which was quite similar to the degree that, for 
example, promotions to the rank of duke were solely reserved for relatives of the king. 
 These entourages, integrated into the royal household and intended to satisfy 
several needs of these infantes, already existed since at least the middle of the previous 
dynasty. The shift during the Avis dynasty was towards increasing the autonomy of 
these groups. By granting a set of territorial jurisdictions in addition to transferring 
administrative, fiscal and military rights, these individuals could construct platforms of 
subsistence that guaranteed the maintenance of the respective clienteles. 
 The formation of these entourages in the case of the Manueline court did not 
differ greatly from the process carried out at the start of the dynasty. At a young age, the 
infantes were assigned a primary group of servants who were physically close and had 
functions connected to the well-being and personal protection. Given the nature of these 
compositions, the first chief officer to be named was the lord chamberlain (camareiro-
mor), who often doubled as provost (guarda-mor). This is the case of infantes Luis (Rui 
Teles de Meneses), Fernando (Jorge de Silveira), Afonso (Garcia de Meneses), and 
Henrique (Simão de Miranda).
16
 These small entourages functioned from the outset as 
an extension of the departments of the progenitors’ household. In a way, the close 
relationship between the officers named for these posts and the king was proportional to 
the physical proximity between the monarch, the heir, and the other infantes. Physical 
space and service to the royal court were combined according to a restricted ceremony, 
where the closest servants were those that accumulated administrative positions.
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During this period, which frequently carried on into the adulthood of the infante, the 
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entourages were completely dependent on the Crown, both economically and 
politically. For example, the entourage of infante Maria, worked as an extension of the 
household of Queen Catarina (1507-1578) until she had her own household (1537).
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Gradually, the other chief officers and respective subordinate posts were assigned 
according to the vicissitudes of the career of the infante in question, and his designated 
place reserved for him in the monarchy. 
 
Table 1. Nomination of chief officer of the infantes Luís, Afonso, Henrique and 
Fernando, 1514-1521 (#individuals/year) 
 
Table 1 reveals that the nomination of several chief officers for infante Afonso, 
particularly from 1514-17, and also those of infante Luis, after 1518, were clearly 
politically motivated. For Afonso, this is related to the precocity of the ecclesiastical 
career in question, given that his status and that hierarchy required an appropriate 
princely court.
19
 Regarding Luis, the documented increase around 1518 can be 
interpreted as a sign of the royal intention to encourage the autonomy of his entourage 
in the short term. This process would culminate in the concession of a title, 




 Many of the officers were members of families who had a tradition of effective 
service in the court, each one with a foro of nobleman (fidalgo) from the royal 
household. The majority also belonged to the royal council. In a considerable number of 
cases, several members of the same family joined an entourage at the same time, 
benefiting from the political importance acquired in the past. It is well established that 
informal relationships based on emotions contributed to these entourages to a great 
extent. Good examples of this dynamic can be found in the Teles de Meneses (Silvas) 
who were in the households of the queens and infante Luis, as well as with the Miranda 
family in the entourage of infante Henrique. Rui Teles de Meneses, 4th Lord of Unhão 
(d.1528), in the service of the queen and the infantes, appointed his wife Guiomar of 
Vilhena as the nanny of infante Isabel (1503-1539), and several of his servants and his 
descendants in prominent positions in the household of infante Luís: Andre (high 
steward, or mordomo-mor), Bras (lord chamberlain), and Antonio (head chaplain, or 
capelão-mor).
21
 As for Simão de Miranda, a nobleman of the royal household and a 
member of the royal council, it is said that after being named lord chamberlain and 
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provost to infante Henrique, he was in a privileged position to include his family 
members in this same entourage.
22
 That also happened with his second son, Diogo de 
Miranda, who inherited the roles his father had held and even transferred the position of 
lord chamberlain to his son Martim Afonso de Miranda, who exercised it while this 
infante was cardinal.
23
 Service provided by other members of the family, such as Simão 
de Miranda II, the son of Fernão de Miranda and grandson of the aforementioned Simão 
de Miranda, and respectively the page and master cupbearer (copeiro mor) of this 
infante, prove the dynamic.
24
 
 As for female descendants, the transfer of officers belonging not only to the 
royal household (per se), but also those originating from the entourages of the queen, 
are particularly important. For example, the well-documented case of infante Isabel 
(1503-1539) indicates that after the death of Queen Maria of Castile and Aragon (1482-
1517), many of her servants worked for the said infante.
25
 It is significant that these 
individuals had already served Queen Isabel of Castile (1470-1498), which in and of 
itself is an example of how these individuals near the Crown moved from household to 
household, entourage to entourage. 
 The division and circulation of servants throughout the different households 
related to the Crown is also visible between the entourages of the other infantes. In a 
later period, given the early death of many of these royal family members, a significant 
number of former servants of infantes Fernando (1507-1534), Beatriz (1504-1538), 
Isabel, and Duarte (1515-1540), entered the household of Luís, even though the 
majority required a direct affiliation (filhamento) in the royal household.
26
 This 
phenomenon proves the investment was made not only in the households of the 
infantes, but also on behalf of several families of small and medium nobility. It also 
asserts the existence of interpersonal networks which extended beyond the environment 




 The monarch did not regard the entourages of the infantes in an innocent 
manner. On the one hand, it was up to him to choose the high officers wisely. In turn, 
that resulted in choosing men close to him and/or men who held some influence in the 
royal council. Alternatively, the integration of these entourages occasionally served as a 
form of redistribution for exceptional services provided to the monarchy. For example, 
Manuel Fernandes, for his role defending the outpost of Sofala (Mozambique) during 
the siege carried out by Muslim troops, was granted by King Manuel I (r. 1495-1521) in 
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 This incident raises doubts about the control that may have been exercised by the 
Crown over the high-ranking members within these entourages with respect to their 
political loyalty. As these infantes gained a greater degree of political autonomy, these 
individuals could exploit this and obtain their own households and estates. It must also 
be pointed out that the said control could be reduced from this point, given that the 
recruitment of officers became (in theory) controlled only by the infante in question. 
Seen from this perspective, the patrimonialization of the positions emerges as a 
phenomenon that may have interested the monarch. The power accumulated by the 
upper hierarchies, inserted into the households of the infantes and connected to the 
Crown, would create conditions which would perpetuate the access to the infante, and 
thus affect the recruitment of new officers. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that 
up to a point, this phenomenon contributed to the Crown manipulating a series of 
informal control mechanisms over the power networks at court. In other words, if the 
monarch could take advantage, informally, of the individuals close to him, he could 
control his direct relatives and the evolution of their princely households. 
 Factors that promoted the growth of these entourages included the age of the 
infante and her or his position within the hierarchy of access to the throne. Hence, in 
theory, the first-born son would have more servants compared to his younger brothers. 
Although there are no absolute numbers, the number of servants exclusively destined 
for the service of each of these infantes could range from one to several dozen, 
depending on the complexity of their entourages. Some evidence proves this fluctuation. 
The entourage of infante Maria had only fourteen paid servants at her service in 1530, 
although one can assume that her entire entourage was larger.
29
 In 1531, the Crown paid 




 The progressive nomination of high officers to several departments – chapel, 
chamber, kitchen (cozinha), pantry (ucharia), stable, among others – called for a 
gradual increase in the recruitment of servants to meet the needs. Recruitment, as a rule, 
was already influenced by the high officers, who took advantage of the opportunity to 
insert their own clients and family members into positions. As such, it is valid to assert 
that in fact these structures constituted the embryo of what would be the composition of 
the princely court of the future household, both from either the domestic apparatus point 
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of view, and the perspective of servants who performed duties both within seigniorial 
spaces, as well as outside them. 
 
Autonomy and Political Power 
 
The necessary step to personalize the entourages of Manueline descendants relative to 
the Crown comes generally from the title given to them, and the inherent resources to 
reflect the increase in their status. The autonomization of the household in its own right 
did not provide the infantes with new powers. On the contrary, it was the donation of 
the title and estate that led to the transfer of part of the royal regalia to the new title 
holders. These entitlements included civil and criminal jurisdiction, the right to levy tax, 
military recruitment, the rights of ecclesiastical presentation (padroado), granting 
nobility to plebeian individuals, and, no less importantly, the nomination of officers 
within the entire seigniorial domains. The importance of these powers in connection 
with the princely dimension of the household relied on operating a distribution network 
of bounties and privileges by the respective clientele and on exploiting the advantages 
that may come regarding the seigniorial recruitment. 
 In the majority of cases, and in a relatively short period of time, this step allowed 
for the formation of households and seigniorial courts with an organic apparatus similar 
to that of the royal household, except for slight variations due to the size of the 
jurisdictions granted. The sophistication and refinement that the court gradually 
experienced during the Manueline kingdom (from the sixteenth century onward) 
resulted in an increased imitation of etiquette and royal ceremonies by the households of 
the infantes. This transition is evident in the existence of complex organic structures in 
the different departments of the domestic apparatus, including the hall (aula regis), 
chamber and chapel. This process culminated in a more autonomous household relative 
to the power that initiated its formation. The implications of this with regard to the royal 
clienteles and their transition to official positions in infantes’ curia will be discussed 
later. 
 The process of emancipation could have been accelerated by the monarch’s 
dynastic policy and the fate determined to suit each one of the children. Matrimonial 
policy (both internally and externally) and royal interference in ecclesiastical 
institutions were great catalysts of the political autonomization of these households. My 
analysis will not consider first-born João (later João III), but rather will focus primarily 
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on infantes Luis, Fernando, Duarte, and Maria, with some attention given to Isabel and 
Beatriz (both married outside the realm in an early period), and Afonso and Henrique 
(who would both pursue ecclesiastical careers).
31
 
 Manuel I’s matrimonial policy, continued after his death by his son João III, paid 
particular attention to the management of the infantes, most of whom had already died 
by around 1540. It is no surprise that the matrimonial projects of the infantes were 
closely scrutinized by the Crown and negotiations dragged on (sometimes deliberately) 
for several years due to external reasons. The cases of Luis and Maria – evident in the 
numerous times they were proposed as candidates for marriages abroad – served this 
purpose. However, the limited solutions open to the House of Avis transformed these 
infantes into some kind of “natural reserve” for the Crown, making a possible marriage 
increasingly difficult as time passed, especially after 1540. 
 
Table 2. Marriages of the descendants of King Manuel I 
 
Excluding the heir Joao and the princesses Isabel and Beatriz, none of the other infantes 
married someone of similar status. Managing Manuel I’s progeny not only did not obey 
the logistics of external politics, but also it was essential for the Crown to control its 
territory effectively. From this perspective, in the case of Luis, the main problem 
stemmed from the control of the peripheral powers. However, the marriage of infante 
Fernando with Guiomar Coutinho (d. 1534) would have contributed to this problem by 
affecting both control of the high nobility and the return of important jurisdictions to the 
royal sphere. Furthermore, the marriage of infante Duarte and Isabel of Braganza (1537) 
forced the House of Braganza to cede a group of jurisdictions that would constitute the 
Guimarães dukedom.
32
 By impeding the reproduction of these households and estates, 
the Crown would end up recovering the donations it had made decades earlier. 
 At the same time, the investment of infantes Afonso and Henrique in their 
ecclesiastical careers allowed the Crown to maximize the degree to which they used 
their progeny. According to some authors, this dynamic must have contributed to a 
greater informal inter-institutional connection between the Crown and the church. A 
narrower view of the relationship between the church and “state” has been discussed 
based on the existence of a mutual dependence between them, allowing the 
ecclesiastical sphere to interfere in civil affairs and vice versa.
33
 With this option, the 
Crown not only held greater control over important ecclesiastical seigniorial lands (for 
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example, the archbishops of Braga and Évora and the monastery of Alcobaça), but it 
also immediately eliminated the problem of succession or reproduction from the 
respective household, an issue that had to be solved if the Crown favored the marriage 
business instead. 
 The timing of the entitlement of infantes, and the establishment of their 
households and courts which were separate from the Crown, did not always coincide. 
Both were dependent on the political situation and the physical accidents – death, 
disease, injury – that could affect the royal family. Hence, the household of Isabel split 
apart very early on, compared to those of her brothers, due exclusively to the death of 
her mother, Queen Maria of Castile and Aragon. Isabel then inherited the seigniorial 
lands from the household of her deceased mother at Torres Vedras and Viseu, lands that 
she later would give up when married to Carlos V (1500-1558). A few decades later, her 
younger half sister, infante Maria (1521-77), became the duchess of those jurisdictions 
when they became vacant after Isabel moved to Castile. Thus, the late medieval 
tradition of conceding a “household” to the princes once they reached a certain age – 
that is, between fourteen and sixteen years – had undergone a set of substantial 
changes.
34
 In general, these infantes became autonomous based on the title that was 
bestowed upon them and/or in accordance with the dynastic projects that the monarch 
reserved for them. 
 
Table 3. Title and autonomy of the households of the Manueline infantes (early 16th 
century) 
 
 Only Beatriz, Fernando and Duarte had a household at the time of receiving a 
title, and only because their marriages justified such promotion. Luís and Fernando only 
completely autonomized their respective households in 1530. Luís benefited from the 
title acquired three years earlier to accelerate this process, because he was twenty-four 
years old at the time of emancipation. But infante Fernando’s marriage to the consort 
Guiomar Coutinho was arranged by King Manuel I, providing emancipation for the 
entourage and establishing the household. The case of Maria is singular in this context, 
given the political conditions inherent to the marriage of her progenitors Manuel I and 
Leonor of Austria (1498-1558), and especially her dowry. For a long period she was 
prohibited from establishing a household separate to the Crown, and only a feud over 
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her fortune in southern France and her pleas to her brother João III resulted in the king’s 




Table 4. Estimated annual income of the Manueline infantes in the mid-16th century 
(millions of reais per year) 
 
 The estimated annual income of these infantes (Table 4) is not easily calculated, 
given that the sources do not refer to specific numbers. The information available will 
only serve to establish estimates and orders of magnitude that allow us to draw 
comparisons with the Portuguese high nobility. The temporary nature of these houses – 
contrary to those of the magnates, with an already reasonably established economic and 
political power – is mirrored in the fluctuation of the respective incomes.
36
 These 
depended on the growth of the household, either by royal incorporation or by 
inheritance, in addition to the capacity of its title holder to reproduce. The importance of 
the hierarchy is evident in this redistribution of resources given that the descendants 
closest to the throne are generally those who have a higher income. This pattern is only 
broken by physical accidents befalling some of these individuals. In fact, Manuel I´s 
descendants who survived the high mortality faced by this generation up to 1540 
managed to amass more resources and privileges. Infante Henrique (d. 1580) outlived 
his brother Afonso (d.1540), and this allowed him to “inherit” his brother’s position and 
accumulate much of the revenue from the posts he had held (including the archbishops 
of Braga, Évora and Lisbon, and revenues from the monasteries of Alcobaça and the 
Priory of Santa Cruz de Coimbra).
37
 Infante Luis survived the majority of his brothers, 
which allowed him gradually to engross some bounties, either by donation from the 
Crown or by individual inheritance. Thus he was able gradually to get closer to the 
annual income of Teodósio, Duke of Braganza (d. 1563), the head of the wealthiest 
household at the time. 
 Even those infantes who died early, without progeny, could gather significant 
economic resources. Infante Fernando (d. 1534) typifies this reality. His marriage to the 
heiress of the household of the counts of Marialva allowed him to reach an annual 
income close to that of Jorge, Duke of Coimbra (1481-1550).
38
 Such an equal income 
level indicates that competition among the infantes and high nobility was a reality. The 
first recipients were, in general, able to obtain more resources to strengthen their 




Table 5. Total payments to servants by the infantes Fernando, Duarte, and Henrique 
(reais/year) 
 
The estimates presented in Table 5 show the expenses with the servants of the infantes 
Fernando, Duarte, and Henrique in the middle of the second quarter of the sixteenth 
century. The hierarchal differences between the position and access to the throne 
reflects the differing sums in these costs. This premise is reinforced by remembering 
that the infante Luís (older than his brothers) spent 3,218,399 reais on his servants in 
1536; this would increase to nearly four million reais in 1555.
39
 From an economic 
point of view, the equality among wages paid for service to the royal family members 
reveals an important trend that resulted from the tendential absence of competition 
between the monarch and his brothers. The process of becoming part of the royal 
household, fostered by the development of the foros of fidalgos (laws of the nobles) of 
the royal household and encouraged by the development of the powerful social 
hierarchy, resulted in cash payments or wages like moradia, cevada, and acostamentos. 
In addition, the amount paid depended on the social status of the individual and the 
family. For example, in 1553 Nuno Pereira, moço-fidalgo (noble boy) of infante Luís 
was promoted to escudeiro-fidalgo (noble squire), and was awarded an above average 
moradia of 1,800 reais per month because his father (Reimão Pereira) was paid the 
same amount for service to the monarch as a member of the royal household.
40
 
 This phenomenon was a mechanism for social ascension that could also 
propitiate the adoption of different strategies by the families interested in working in 
service of the infantes’ households. The affiliation (filhamento) of a descendant for each 
household related to the Crown would be a way of guaranteeing their social ascent, 
without them having to follow alternative routes such as leaving for overseas territories 
or ecclesiastical service. Perhaps the most paradigmatic case is that of Pedro, Fernando, 
and Antonio, sons of Martinho de Noronha, lord of Cadaval, who would serve in the 




Table 6. Size of the households of the Manueline infantes 
 
 Much attention has already been given to a specific indicator: the growth of staff 
in the royal and princely courts. A significant part of the historiography linked the 
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increasing numbers of the servants with the power and the capacity of political 
patronage of the household in question. First, the order of magnitude of these 
households was in many hundreds. Except for the abnormal numbers in the households 
of infante Luís, the number of residents of the others could be estimated to be between 
200 and 300 individuals. Such figures makes these structures comparable, in terms of 
size, to the largest households of the most important English counts and dukes in the 
late fifteenth century, where the majority of the respective entourages would have been 
between 100 and 200 residents; this trend was maintained at the start of the following 
century.
42
 However, these orders of magnitude do not reflect the total dependents of a 
household. The progressive increase of territorial jurisdictions and other bounties of 
varying character led to the increase of the number of servants for these title holders. In 
addition, it is possible to understand how infante Luís held, between the decades of the 
1540s and 1550s, an average of approximately 600 residents.
43
 This same phenomenon 
could have happened with infante Henrique, especially after he was named a cardinal, 
though the lack of in depth studies does not allow us to make a definitive conclusion. It 
is certain, therefore, that the numbers tend to reflect an evident hierarchy in the high 
nobility of the kingdom. Only in this way can it be explained, for example, that infante 
Luis – possessing fewer resources – had more residents than the greatest title holder of 




 Despite the efforts of scholars, the composition of the royal court in the 
households of the Manueline descendants has not been covered in great detail. Little is 
known about the political loyalties of the most influential officials of these entourages, 
or the provenance of the low and middle strata of clientele. Surely the most salient 
aspect is the evident hybridism between these groups. It is known that by forming part 
of the entourages, noblemen necessarily became connected to the royal household, and 
initially, the majority of these royal courts were controlled by individuals who were 
affiliated (in the strict sense of filhamento) to the house of the king. An example lies in 
the composition of the elites of the seigniorial house of infante Luís. The data available 
indicates that in the uppermost social strata (here, the foro, corresponding to fidalgo-
cavaleiro
45
), around 71 percent of these individuals already held offices in the royal 
household and/or central administration of the kingdom during 1536.
46
 In other cases, 
such as that of infante Duarte (also 71 percent in 1540) and infante Fernando (100 





 On the other hand, some indicators point to a decline in this hybridism over 
time. With regard to the household of infante Luis, only 41 percent of this group of elite 
clientele had already served under the same conditions in 1555.
48
 Obviously this 
variation dependent greatly on the political success of the household, the possibilities 
for political patronage, and the bounties that the title holder could distribute. The 
decrease in this percentage is due especially to the fact that many of the new members 
of this elite – largely the descendants of nobility who accompanied the infante from the 
formation of the entourage in the royal court – now benefited from this seigniorial 
patronage. It bears repeating that the Crown did not possesses the monopoly on granting 
bounties and privileges, among them military commands and even granting titles of 
nobility. This privilege was also an appanage from the large households of the kingdom, 
including those from the royal infantes, Braganza, Aveiro and Vila Real.
49
 
 As a result, the greater autonomy and the title attribution policy extended the 
range of families who saw some of their members and/or other dependents affiliated in 
the households of the infantes. A closer look at the family backgrounds of these new 
servants – regardless of their eventual nobility – reveals a trend that lies in establishing 
multiple connections with other spheres of power, especially small and medium 
nobility. In addition to the aforementioned Teles de Meneses, Botelho and Beja 
families, the household of the infante Luís was frequented by members from the 
following families: Almeida, Silveiras, Figueira, Sousa, and Noronha. Identical practice 
can be found in the household of infante Fernando (populated by members of the 
Tavora, Silveira, Moura and Silva families) or in the household of infante Duarte (Melo, 
Meneses, Lima, Figueira, among others).
50
 This trend is considered to be another 
indicator of the power of attraction of these households, and their capacity of 
redistributing resources and positions. 
 Royal practices for attracting clienteles were generally copied by the infantes, 
particularly the prerogative of appointing people to the administrative and military 
posts, which allowed them to obtain the political loyalty of the main families present in 
these royal courts. Frequently, among these servants of the households of the infantes, 
there were governors (alcaide-mor) of the castles located in the jurisdictional areas 
contained within the respective seigniorial lands.
51
 The Crown had already 
experimented with this form of political patronage that helped to guarantee the loyalty 
of these family groups. Even the fact that the appointment could only occur in a vacancy 
after the death of the respective office title holder did not prevent  the prince, in some 
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cases, from breaking with the lineage in possession of such positions. In doing so, it 
legitimized the nobility that depended on it at the expense of former officials and 
descendants who, in theory, would then succeed them in the post.
52
 This dynamic in 
exercising jurisdictional rights made the infantes potentially more competitive in the 
political field than queens, for example, who rarely provided officials from their own 
household in these positions. On the contrary, the nominations frequently benefited the 
officials connected to the monarch.
53
 
 On the other hand, favoring these servants also created problems. The 
appointment of these administrative and military posts suggests a clear intention to 
control not only the territory, but also the men under the jurisdiction of the prince. At 
stake was a compromise between the central government and peripheral representatives. 
Providing individuals outside these regions could cause divisions in the local 
oligarchies. It was not uncommon that the individuals appointed to these posts did not 
serve them in person, and instead selected an inferior hierarchical delegate to be resident 
physically and do the work.
54
 Again, the lack of in-depth studies does not allow a 
conclusive explanation for this phenomenon. However, it is probable they would look 
for a balance between the risks and the benefits. 
 Another dimension that should be highlighted is the integration of these 
individuals into other spheres of power under the rule of the infantes, such as military 
orders and ecclesiastical structures. Given the lack of well-defined borders between the 
public and private spheres during this period, it was common for these servants to 
participate in the political projects of their lords. With a few exceptions, this 
phenomenon had the monarch’s approval and thus cannot serve as a direct indicator for 
the study of political allegiances. Instead, it constitutes evidence of seigniorial domain 
over the clienteles and the political use that the absence of institutional boundaries 
provided. The most characteristic examples possibly reside in the recruitment done by 
Luís and Henrique, although for different purposes. The appointment of several servants 
from the seigniorial household of infante Henrique to hold positions in the Inquisition 
was a manner of responding to the lack of resources plaguing this institution, which, in 
the decades of 1530s and 1540s, was in an early stage of organic definition.
55
 More than 
the mobility of human resources inherent here, it is important to highlight the 
capitalization of close ties established with their servants. A strong indication of this 
dynamic is evident in the case of infante Luís who used a considerable number of 
servants of his household in the war against Islam and/or in the works for the Order of 
17 
 
Malta (through the Priory of Crato). The fact that he had prepared and used a military 
contingent, of which his servants formed part, in the expedition to Tunis in 1535 is 






An analysis of the formation of the seigniorial households of the Manueline infantes and 
their political use within the context of the sixteenth-century Portuguese monarchy 
clearly reveals that the donation of large households and estates to the infantes had 
remarkable consequences from the point of view of the reorganization of the various 
strata of the nobility, at both the bottom and top of the pyramid. The first consequences 
are notable from the point of view of the first nobility of the kingdom. Some high 
nobility of great prominence, such as the Duke of Braganza or the Marquis of Vila Real, 
were relegated to the second tier with the provision of the Manueline bloodline. There is 
a large difference between how infantes were granted households during the periods of 
João I/Duarte I and Manuel I/ João III. In the early days of the Avis dynasty, there were 
no seigniorial households of great power in terms of territorial jurisdictions and number 
of servants (with the exception of the House of Braganza), but the picture changes 
significantly during the reign of Manuel I and João III. The need to reconfigure the 
upper strata of the nobility was, therefore, obvious. 
 As a result of this transformation, there was a notable increase in competition 
among the various levels of nobility. Despite the said increase, it is proven by the 
disputes between the large households that the role of small and medium nobility must 
be highlighted in this context. Individuals at these levels would, in principle, have the 
most to gain from the service to these households of the infantes. Obtaining posts close 
to the descendants of the king served to catapult these groups from minor nobility to 
eventually achieving a title. In order to foment this competitive potential, the monarchy 
decided to transfer a series of privileges, rights and jurisdictions that, at their limit, were 
almost as attractive as the royal sphere. It was the best way of guaranteeing that these 
households, as a general rule, were able to satisfy the local and regional elites in the 
distribution of a series of bounties and offices. Through this dynamic, it would be easier 
to establish clientele relations in these peripheral spaces and obtain the political loyalty 
of these social strata. 
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 While detailed studies about patronage of these households from Manueline 
infantes are still taking form, little evidence suggests that high palatine officers had a 
prominent role in patron-client relationships. Intimacy with the prince could lead to 
future profits for a servant and, eventually, for some members of his respective family 
as well. Examples within this volume, regarding other European geographies, show 
similarities in this. Alexander Brondarbit notes that in fifteenth-century England, for 
example, servants of the royal household would benefit from the monarch’s patronage 
and thus were also able to sustain vast networks at the local and regional level. 
 From the point of view of the Crown, the advantages of making the entourages 
of the infantes autonomous surpassed the risks. The legal mechanisms of control and 
interpersonal relationships between the royal family members and nobility during this 
period would benefit from the political uses that the monarchy granted to these 
households. These structures would not lack material and human resources to compete 
with the main noble households of the kingdom based on the coeval hierarchy. 
Incidentally, the monarch frequently exploited his brothers and their households to 
prevent the growth of the high nobility, such as Braganza and Aveiro. Factors such as 
political marriage and the careful provision of some of the infantes in the ecclesiastical 
sphere were important in controlling the interrelationships of the power spheres and 
institutions present in sixteenth-century society. 
 On the other hand, it was important to enhance the role of the royal household 
members within the entourages of the Manueline infantes. Politically committed 
courtiers would favor the way these constellations of courts were used by the monarchy. 
The tendency for the king to control other related households, by office nomination, was 
apparent since early days. Other case studies in this volume present resemblances. For 
example, Germán Igea argues that the reign of the Spanish Catholic Kings was rich in 
attempts to control the Castilian-Aragonese court according to the relative positioning 
of respective households. Hence, the household’s autonomy only could be achieved by 
having direct control over office nomination. 
 It is not possible, in my opinion, to speak of an increased rate of political 
centralization during this period, given the distribution of powers experienced in the 
kingdom until the end of the Ancien Régime. Further, it must be stressed that the 
households of the infantes would contribute to this phenomenon by not being more 
extensive. Even paradoxically, the redistribution of resources and privileges through 
these households would result, in the mid- to the long term, in an increase of territorial 
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control by the Crown. In short, throughout the sixteenth century, these households 
would become alternative centers of power, with a strong connection to the peripheral 
powers and a considerable clientele network, thus constituting true competitors in the 
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